Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate: Background and Issues for Congress by O'Rourke, Ronald
Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RL32418
Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level
Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated May 25, 2006
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level
Goal and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Of the 282 ships in the Navy at the end of FY2005, 54 were nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs).  The Navy is planning to maintain in coming years a fleet
of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs.  The Navy is currently procuring one Virginia
(SSN-774) class SSN per year.  Each submarine currently costs about $2.6 billion.
The FY2007-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) proposes maintaining the
one-per-year procurement rate through FY2011, and then increasing the rate to two
per year in FY2012.
The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be
sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run.  The Navy
projects that the SSN force under this plan would fall below 48 boats during the 14-
year period 2020-2033, reaching a minimum of 40 boats in 2028-2029.  In addition,
for the first time in about 50 years, there is currently no new submarine being
designed, which has led to a decline in work for submarine designers and engineers.
Issues for Congress include the following:  Is 48 the correct number of SSNs to
meet future needs?  Should the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement be
accelerated from FY2012 to an earlier year, such as FY2009, so as to come closer to
maintaining a force of 48 SSNs in the 2020s-2030s?  How should the submarine
design and engineering base be maintained in coming years?
FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5122/S. 2766)
House.  Section 121 of H.R. 5122 would amend 10 USC 5062 to state that the
Navy shall include not less than 48 operational attack submarines.  Section 331
would require a report on submarine depot maintenance.  Section 1221 would make
it U.S. policy to make plans and options for diesel-electric submarines available to
Taiwan.  The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 109-452 of
May 5, 2006) on H.R. 5122, recommends $400 million in additional FY2007
advance procurement funding to support the acceleration of the start of two-per-year
Virginia-class production to FY2009.  The report recommends $45 million in
research and development funding three design projects relating to the Virginia class,
and $10 million in research and development funding for a competition to design a
new Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) mini-submarine.
Senate.  The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 109-254
of May 9, 2006) on S. 2766, recommended approving the Navy’s requested amount
for FY2007 procurement funding for the Virginia-class program, urged the Navy to
move toward two-per-year Virginia-class procurement beginning in FY2010, and
directed the Navy to better define its plan for reducing the procurement cost of the
Virginia-class design.  The report recommends $65 million in additional research and
development funding for six design projects relating to the Virginia class, and $10
million in additional research and development funding to begin design work on the
next ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
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Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
Of the 282 ships in the Navy at the end of FY2005, 54 were nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs).  The Navy is planning to maintain in coming years a fleet
of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs.1
The Navy is currently procuring one Virginia (SSN-774) class SSN per year.
Each submarine currently costs about $2.6 billion.  The FY2007-FY2011 Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP) proposes maintaining the one-per-year procurement rate
through FY2011, and then increasing the rate to two per year in FY2012.
The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be
sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run.  The Navy
projects that the SSN force under this plan would fall below 48 boats during the 14-
year period 2020-2033, reaching a minimum of 40 boats in 2028-2029.  In addition,
for the first time in about 50 years, there is currently no new submarine being
designed, which has led to a decline in work for submarine designers and engineers.
Issues for Congress include the following:
! Is 48 the correct number of SSNs to meet future needs?
! Should the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement be
accelerated from FY2012 to an earlier year, such as FY2009, so as
to come closer to maintaining a force of 48 SSNs in the 2020s-
2030s?
! How should the submarine design and engineering base be
maintained in coming years?
Congress’s decisions on these issues could significantly affect future Navy
capabilities, Navy funding requirements, and the submarine industrial base.
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2 The Navy also includes mine warfare ships and a variety of auxiliary and support ships.
3 An exception for the U.S. Navy is the non-combat auxiliary submarine Dolphin (AGSS-
555), a small submarine that the Navy uses for research and development work.  As a non-
combat research asset, the Dolphin is not included in counts of the total number of
submarines (or battle force ships of all kinds) in the Navy.  Until the 1950s, the U.S. Navy
included many non-nuclear-powered combat submarines.  Following the advent of nuclear
power in the mid-1950s, construction of new non-nuclear-powered combat submarines
ended and the total number of non-nuclear-powered combat submarines in Navy service
began to decline.  The Navy’s last in-service non-nuclear-powered combat submarine was
retired in 1990.  Most military submarines around the world are non-nuclear-powered.  Five
countries — the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Russia, and China —
operate nuclear-powered submarines.  The United States and the UK operate all-nuclear
submarine fleets, while the other three countries operate both nuclear- and non-nuclear-
powered submarines.  A submarine’s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy
source is not necessarily an indication of whether it is armed with nuclear weapons.  A
nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered
submarine can be armed with nuclear weapons.
4 In the designations SSBN, SSGN, and SSN, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-
powered, B stands for ballistic missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise
missile).
The next section of this report provides background information on Navy
submarines, the Virginia-class program, and the submarine construction industrial
base.  The following section addresses the above issues for Congress.
Background
Submarines in the U.S. Navy
Types of Submarines.  Submarines are one of four principal categories of
combat ships that traditionally have helped define the size and structure of the U.S.
Navy.  The other three are aircraft carriers, surface combatants (e.g., cruisers,
destroyers, and frigates), and amphibious ships.2
Submarines are powered by either nuclear reactors or non-nuclear power sources
such as diesel engines or fuel cells.  All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-powered.3
Roles and Missions.  U.S. Navy submarines fall into three types — nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).4
SSBNs.  The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their
nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and thereby deter a
strategic nuclear attack on the United States.  Although this mission is often
associated with the Cold War-era nuclear competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union, it has continued, with some modifications, in the post-Cold War
CRS-3
5 For a discussion of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons policy and force structure, see CRS
Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, by Amy
F. Woolf. 
6 The Navy in the late 1950s and early 1960s built and operated two non-nuclear-powered
cruise missile submarines (or SSGs — the Grayback [SSG-574] and the Growler [SSG-577])
and one nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (the Halibut [SSGN-587]).  The
submarines could each carry two Regulus II strategic nuclear cruise missiles.  In the mid-
1960s, following the deployment of the Navy’s initial SSBNs, the Regulus cruise missile
was removed from service and the Grayback, Growler, and Halibut were converted into
attack and auxiliary transport submarines.
7 Each SSGN as converted will retain its 24 large (7-foot-diameter, 44-foot-long) SLBM
launch tubes.  In one possible configuration, 22 of these tubes would be used to carry a total
of 154 Tomahawks (7 Tomahawks per tube) while the remaining two would be used as
lockout chambers for an embarked force of 66 SOF personnel.  In the future, the 24 tubes
could be used to carry large numbers of other payloads, such as unmanned vehicles.  The
SSGNs as converted will also retain their four original 21-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and
their internal torpedo magazines.  In discussing the SSGNs, Navy officials often express a
desire to take maximum advantage of the very large payload volume on each SSGN by
developing new unmanned vehicles or other advanced payloads.  For more on the Navy’s
SSGN conversion program, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion
(SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
era.5  As of the end of FY2005, the Navy included 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class
SSBNs, which are commonly called Trident submarines because they carry Trident
SLBMs.  Each Trident SSBN can carry 24 Trident SLBMs.
SSGNs.  The Navy’s SSGNs, which are a new addition to the fleet,6 are former
Trident SSBNs that are being converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk cruise
missiles and special operations forces (SOF) rather than SLBMs. A total of four
SSGNs are planned; the first was completed in January 2006, and the fourth is
scheduled to be completed by September 2007.  Upon reentering service as SSGNs,
the ships are scheduled to remain in operation for about 20 years.7
Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission
orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and
SOF support, while the SSNs are more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs are
sometimes included in counts of the projected total number of Navy attack
submarines.
SSNs.  The SSNs — the focus of this report — are general-purpose submarines
that perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions, including the following:
! covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of
it done for national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
! covert insertion and recovery of SOF;
! covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise
missiles;
! covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
! anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
! anti-surface ship warfare.
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8 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection
operations during the Cold War, see Sherry  Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette
Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).
9 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials,
Submarine Programs, Mar. 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral Raymond G.
Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in
U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and
Regional Defense, Submarine Programs, June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
10 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review,
July 1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review
Allowed,”  Inside the Navy, Nov. 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold
War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon Urges
Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, Mar. 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara
Nagy,  “ Size of Sub Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1,
A8.
11 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up
Review, Oct. 1993, pp. 55-57.
12 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
During the Cold War, ASW against the Soviet submarine force was the primary
stated mission of U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery
operations were important on a day-to-day basis as well.8  In the post-Cold War era,
although maintaining a capability for conducting anti-submarine warfare against the
Russian submarine force remains a mission, the Navy has placed increased emphasis
on missions that contribute to U.S. military operations in littoral (near-shore) areas
against regional adversaries other than Russia.
Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
Previous Administrations.  The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy
included an objective of achieving and maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.  The George
H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally
called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.9  In 1992, however, the
SSN goal was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level
requirement study (updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs,
including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.10
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of
U.S. defense policy, established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships,
including 45 to 55 SSNs.11  The Clinton administration’s 1997 QDR supported a
requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and established a tentative SSN force-
level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of peacetime operational
requirements.”12  The Clinton administration later amended the SSN figure to 55
boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
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13 Department of Navy point paper dated Feb. 7, 2000.  Reprinted in Inside the Navy, Feb.
14, 2000, p. 5.
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review,  Sept. 2001, p. 23.
15 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p.
1;  Lolita C. Baldor, “Study Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May
13, 2004.
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in
December 1999.  The study had three main conclusions:
! “that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and
62 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the
regional military commanders-in-chief] with insufficient capability
to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other
requirements of higher national interest.  Additionally, this force
structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and  62 in 2025] would be sufficient to
meet the modeled war fighting requirements;”
! “that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18
Virginia class SSNs in the 2015 time frame;” and
! “that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025
time frame would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence
community’s highest operational and collection requirements.”13
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of
required SSN force levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not
translated into official Department of Defense (DOD) force-level goals.
George W. Bush Administration.  The George W. Bush Administration’s
report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended requirement from the 1997 QDR
for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs.  In revalidating this and other U.S.
military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD’s “transformation
effort matures — and as it produces significantly higher output of military value from
each element of the force — DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure
and reorganize the Armed Forces.”14
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in
2003-2004.  One of the Navy studies — an internal Navy study done in 2004 —
reportedly recommended reducing  the attack submarine force level requirement to
as few as 37 boats.  The study reportedly recommended homeporting a total of nine
attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack submarines.15
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force
levels out to FY2035.  The report presented two alternatives for FY2035 — a 260-
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16 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan
for the Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2006.  The report was delivered to the House
and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on Mar. 23, 2005.
17 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day
(New London, CT), May 27, 2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub
Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005. 
18  Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Ship Plan To Cost 20% More,” Defense News, December 5,
2005: 1, 8.  See also David S. Cloud, “Navy To Expand Fleet With New Enemies in Mind,”
New York Times, December 5, 2005.
ship fleet including 37 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs.16
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack
submarine requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.17
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313
ships, including 48 SSNs.18  Under this plan, SSNs would account for about 15% of
the fleet.
Attack Submarine Force Levels
Historical.  During the first half of the Cold War, the total number of attack
submarines (both nuclear- and non-nuclear-powered) accounted for an increasing
percentage of the total size of the Navy, increasing from roughly 10% of total battle
force ships in the early 1950s to about 17% by the late 1970s.  Since that time, attack
submarines have accounted for roughly 17% to 22% of total battle force ships.  At
the end of FY2005, they accounted for about 19% (54 ships of 282).
The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, peaked
at 98 boats at the end of FY1987, and then began to decline.  The force included 85
to 88 boats during the early 1990s, 79 boats at the end of FY1996, 65 boats at the end
of FY1998, 57 boats at the end of FY1999, and 56 boats at the end of FY2000.  It has
since numbered 53 to 56 boats.
As of End of FY2005.  The 54 SSNs in service at the end of FY2005 included
the following:
! 50 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
! 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
! 1 Virginia (SSN-774) class boat.
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class SSNs.  A total of 62 Los Angeles-class
submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between FY1970 and FY1990 and
entered service between 1976 and 1996.  They are equipped with four 21-inch
diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise
missiles in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines.  The final 31 boats in the class
(SSN-719 and higher) are equipped with an additional 12 vertical launch system
(VLS) tubes in their bows for carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise
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19 Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged
displacement of about 7,150 tons.  Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet.  SSN-21 and
SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons.  SSN-23 was built to a
configuration.  It is 100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged
displacement of 12,158 tons.
20 Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.
21 GD/EB and NGNN are the only two shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-
powered ships.  GD/EB builds submarines only, while NGNN also builds nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships.
missiles.  The final 23 boats in the class (SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further
improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles class boats or 688Is.  As
of the end of FY2005, 12 of the 62 boats in the class had been retired.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class SSNs.  The Seawolf class was originally intended
to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three
boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated changes in military
requirements.  The three Seawolf-class submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21), the
Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23).  SSN-21 and SSN-22 were
procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively.
SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992.  Its procurement was suspended in 1992
and then reinstated in FY1996.  It was commissioned into service on February 19,
2005.  Seawolf-class submarines are larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous
U.S. Navy SSNs,19 and are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and
can carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles.
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program
General.  The Virginia-class attack submarine was designed to be less
expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the
Seawolf-class design.  The Virginia-class design is slightly larger than the Los
Angeles-class design,20 but incorporates newer technologies.  Virginia-class boats
currently cost about $2.6 billion each to procure.
Joint Production Arrangement.  Virginia-class boats are built jointly by
General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset
Point, RI, and Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding (NGNN) of Newport
News, VA.21  Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat,
NGNN builds certain other parts of each boat, and the yards take turns building the
reactor compartments and performing final assembly of the boats.  GD/EB is building
the reactor compartments and performing final assembly on boats 1, 3, and so on,
while NGNN is doing so on boats 2, 4, and so on.  The arrangement results in a
roughly 50-50 division of Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves
both yards’ ability to build submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a
submarine-construction yard) and perform submarine final assembly work.
The joint production arrangement is a departure from past U.S. submarine
construction practices, under which complete submarines were built in individual
yards.  The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over the Virginia-
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22 As part of its proposed FY2004 budget submitted to Congress in February 2003, the Navy
requested multiyear procurement authority (MYP) to procure a total of seven Virginia-class
boats during the five-year period FY2004-FY2008 (i.e., one boat per year for
FY2004-FY2006, then two boats per year for FY2007-FY2008, as shown in the top line in
the table above).  Congress, as part of its action on the FY2004 defense budget, granted
authority in appropriation bill language for a five-boat MYP during this period (i.e., one boat
per year for FY2004-FY2008).  The Navy estimates that the five-boat MYP arrangement
will reduce the total cost of the five boats by a total of about $400 million, or an average of
$80 million per boat.  The Navy estimated that a seven-boat MYP arrangement would have
reduced the cost of the seven boats in question by an average of about $115 million per boat.
The five-boat MYP authority was accompanied by appropriation conference report language
that the Navy and other observers interpreted as strongly cautioning the Navy against
including funding in future budgets to support the procurement of a second boat in either
FY2007 or FY2008.  (Section 8008 of the bill approved MYP authority for the Virginia-
class program “Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy may not enter into a multiyear
contract for the procurement of more than one Virginia Class submarine per year.”  For the
bill and report language on Congress’s decision, see H.Rept. 108-283 (FY2004 defense
appropriations bill, H.R. 2658/P.L. 108-87) pp. 20, 185-186.)  Consistent with this
interpretation, the Administration’s amended FY2005-FY2009 FYDP included funding for
only one Virginia class boat per year for the period FY2005-FY2008.
class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that
occurred in 1995-1997 (i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense
budgets).  The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB and NGNN involved
in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards
capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties
of using two yards rather than one to build a submarine design that is being procured
at a low annual rate.
Procurement Through FY2006.   The first Virginia-class boat was procured
in FY1998 and entered service on October 23, 2004.  As shown in Table 1 below,
a total of eight Virginia-class boats have been procured through FY2006.  Virginia-
class boats are being procured in FY2004-FY2008 under a multiyear procurement
(MYP) arrangement.22
Table 1. Virginia-Class Procurement, FY1998-FY2006
FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Planned Procurement Rates. When Virginia-class procurement began in
the 1990s, DOD originally projected that the procurement rate would increase to two
boats per year in FY2002.  In subsequent years, this date was pushed back several
times.  Most recently, the FY2004-FY2009 FYDP that the Administration submitted
to Congress in February 2003 projected increasing the Virginia-class procurement
rate to two per year starting in FY2007.  The FY2005-FY2009 FYDP submitted in
February 2004 delayed this projected increase to FY2009.  The FY2006-FY2011
submitted in February 2005 delayed it to FY2012, and the FY2007-FY2011 FYDP
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submitted in February 2006 retains this plan.  Table 2 below compares planned
Virginia-class procurement in these FYDPs.
Table 2. Proposed Virginia-Class Procurement
FYDP (date) FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11
FY04-FY09 (2/03) 1 1 1 2 2 2
FY05-FY09 (2/04) 1 1 1 1 2
FY06-FY11 (2/05) 1 1 1 1 1 1
FY07-FY11 (2/06) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Source: Prepared by CRS using Navy data.
Cost-Reduction Goal.  The Navy says that its plan to increase Virginia-class
procurement to two per year starting in FY2012 is contingent on being able to reduce
the procurement cost of Virginia-class submarines to $2.0 billion each in constant
FY2005 dollars, compared to a current cost of about $2.4 billion each in constant
FY2005 dollars.  The Navy has established cost-reduction targets for several of its
shipbuilding programs, but the Virginia-class program is apparently the only program
that must meet its cost reduction target as an internal Navy condition for maintaining
all ships of that type in the Navy’s shipbuilding program.
The target cost of $2.0 billion in constant FY2005 dollars, when translated into
FY2012 dollars, would equal about $2.5 billion, permitting two Virginia-class boats
to be procured in that year for a total of about $5.0 billion.
The Navy says that, in constant FY2005 dollars, more than $150 million of the
$400 million in sought-after cost reductions would be accomplished simply through
the improved economies of scale (e.g., better spreading of shipyard fixed costs and
improved learning rates) of producing two submarines per year rather than one per
year.  Much of the remaining $250 million in sought-after cost reductions, the Navy
says, is to be accomplished through the development of new technologies that would
permit certain parts of the Virginia-class design to be less expensive to build, but no
less capable.  These new technologies, the Navy says, are scheduled to be ready for
boats procured in FY2012.  Consequently, the Navy says, the $2.0 billion target cost
cannot be fully achieved before FY2012.
The Navy says that if improved economies of scale and new technologies are
insufficient to achieve the $2.0-billion target, it may consider reducing the
capabilities of the Virginia class in certain areas until the target is achieved.
Another option for reducing Virginia-class procurement costs, the Navy says,
would be to modify the joint-production agreement for producing Virginia-class
boats so as to better optimize the overall production process.  Such a change, the
Navy says, might reduce the cost of each boat by $25 million to $80 million.  This
proposal could shift certain Virginia-class production work from one of the two
production shipyards to the other, increasing the amount of work done by one yard
while reducing amount done by the other.  Since the joint-production agreement
cannot be modified without the agreement of both of both yards, the Navy does not
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include the idea of modifying agreement as part of its plan for achieving the Virginia-
class cost-reduction goal.
The Navy’s goal to reduce the cost of each Virginia-class boat to $2.0 billion in
constant FY2005 dollars as a condition for increasing the procurement rate to two
boats per year in FY2012 is a goal that the Navy has set for itself.  While Congress
may take this goal into account, it need not control congressional action.  Congress
may decide to fund the procurement of two boats per year in FY2012 or some other
year even if the goal is not met.
Funding Requirements For Accelerated Production.  Some observers
have proposed accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class production to a
year earlier than FY2012, such as FY2009, so as to mitigate a projected future
shortfall in SSNs that is discussed in the next section.  Table 3 below shows the
additional funding that would be needed during the FY2007-FY2011 FYDP to
accelerate the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement to FY2009.  As shown
in the table, the Navy estimates that accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-
class procurement to FY2009 would require $400 million in additional funding in
FY2007, and a total of $7.4 billion in additional funding over the FY2007-FY2011
FYDP.
Table 3.  Funding For Accelerated Virginia-Class Procurement
(procurement funding in billions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)





   Ship quantity 1 1 1 1 1 5
   Funding 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.8 3.8 16.1
Acceleration of two-per year procurement to FY2009
   Ship quantity 1 1 2 2 2 8
   Funding 2.9 3.1 6.0 5.9 5.6 23.5
Additional funding for acceleration relative to FY2009-FY2011 FYDP
0.4 0.6 2.5 2.1 1.8 7.4
Source: U.S. Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, March 3, 2006.
SSN Procurement Plan and Future SSN Force Levels
The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be
sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run.  As shown
in Table 4, the Navy projects that the SSN force under this plan would fall below 48
boats during the 14-year period 2020-2033, reaching a minimum of 40 boats in 2028-
2029.  Since the Navy plans to retire the four SSGNs by 2029 without procuring any
replacements for them, no SSGNs would be available in 2029 and subsequent years
to compensate for a drop in SSN force level below 48 boats.
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Future, July 1998, pp. 7, 19-20.
24 CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress (out of print; for a copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
25 CRS Report RL31372, Navy Shipbuilding in the FY2003 Defense Budget: Issues for
Congress (out of print; for a copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
26  U.S. Department of the Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2007.  Washington, 2006.  8 pp.
Table 4.  SSN Force Level, 2007-2036 (Navy Projection)
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
52 53 54 53 53 54 55 53 52 50 50 48 48 47 47
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
47 46 45 44 43 42 40 40 41 42 44 46 48 49 51
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels
for FY 2007.
The potential for the Navy’s long-range SSN procurement plan to produce a
shortfall in the SSN force over the long run has been discussed by CRS in testimony
to Congress in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006, in a 1997 CRS
presentation to a Defense Science Board task force on the submarine of the future,
which issued its report in 1998;23 in a 1999-2000 CRS report,24 in a 2002 CRS
report,25 and in this report since its inception in 2004.
Table 5 presents CRS projections of SSN force levels through FY2050 using
attack submarine procurement rates of 1, 1.5, and 2 boats per year.  The table also
shows, in the middle column, a CRS projection of the SSN force-level through 2036
using the Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan.26  The CRS projection using the
Navy’s SSN procurement plan differs from the Navy’s projection shown in Table 4
in two ways.  First, the CRS projection retains all existing SSNs in service to age 33,
resulting in higher SSN force levels in the earlier years of the projection than under
the Navy projection.  Second, CRS measures the ages of existing SSNs slightly
differently than does the Navy, resulting in some differences in when existing SSNs
are retired.  As a result, for example, the CRS shows the SSN force dropping below
48 boats in 2018, two years earlier than under the Navy’s projection.  Both the CRS
and Navy projections show the SSN force reaching a minimum of 40 boats in 2028
and 2029, and recovering to 48 boats by 2034.
Among other things, Table 5 shows that none of the SSN procurement profiles
presented — not even 2 boats per year starting in FY2007 — is sufficient to avoid
dropping below 48 attack submarines for some period of time starting between
FY2018 and FY2026.
Table 6 presents notional attack submarine procurement profiles for the period
FY2007-FY2031 that would fully support attack submarine forces of 30, 40, 48, 50,
55, 60, and 70 boats (excluding any SSGNs).  None of the profiles calls for procuring
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27 Exceptions to the 6-year construction period include the second boats procured in FY2007
and FY2008, which are assumed to enter service 8 years and 7 years after they are procured,
respectively, due to lack of advance procurement funding for the FY2007 boat in FY2005
and FY2006 and for the FY2008 boat in FY2006.
more than four boats per year — the maximum annual rate that was achieved for
attack submarines during the Cold War years of the 1980s, when the Navy was
working toward achieving and maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.
For the Navy’s reported planned force level of 48 SSNs, Table 6 shows three
profiles — A, B, and C — that increase the procurement rate to two boats per year
in FY2012, FY2009, and FY2007, respectively.  As can be seen from these three
profiles, starting to procure two boats per year earlier reduces the number of
subsequent years in which three boats need to be procured.
The projections in Table 5 and Table 6 assume a 6-year construction period27
and 33-year SSN service life.  If SSN service life turns out to be less than 33 years,
force levels could be lower than those shown in Table 5, and the number of SSNs to
be procured to support a force of a given target size could be greater than shown in
Table 6.  The current high operational tempo for the attack submarine force could
reduce the service lives of SSNs to something less than 33 years by accelerating the
rate at which reactor core life is used up.
If SSN life can be extended to more than 33 years, force levels could be higher
than those shown in Table 5, and the number of SSNs to be procured to support a
force of a given target size could be less than shown in Table 6.  The feasibility and
potential cost of extending the service lives of the Navy’s SSNs is not clear.   Unlike
earlier Navy SSNs, which were built with reactor cores intended to last about 15
years, Seawolf- and Virginia-class boats have cores that are intended to last the 33-
year expected life of the ship.  Extending the lives of Seawolf- or Virginia-class boats
40 years, if feasible, could involve changing their life-cycle maintenance plans to
include a refueling at about age 33 or earlier.
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Table 5. Steady Procurement Rates & Resulting Force Levels
















07 1 56 1 56 1 56 1 56 1 56 1 56 2 56
08 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 57 2 57
09 1 57 1 57 2 57 1 57 1 57 2 57 2 57
10 1 56 1 56 1 56 1 56 1 56 2 56 2 56
11 1 57 1 57 2 57 1 57 1 57 2 57 2 57
12 1 58 2 58 1 58 2 58 2 58 2 58 2 58
13 1 59 1 59 2 59 2 59 2 59 2 59 2 59
14 1 55 2 55 1 55 2 55 2 55 2 55 2 55
15 1 55 1 55 2 56 2 55 2 55 2 56 2 58
16 1 51 2 51 1 52 2 51 2 51 2 53 2 55
17 1 49 1 49 2 51 2 49 2 49 2 52 2 54
18 1 46 2 47 1 48 2 47 2 47 2 50 2 52
19 1 45 1 46 2 48 2 47 2 47 2 50 2 52
20 1 44 2 46 1 47 2 47 2 47 2 50 2 52
21 1 43 1 45 2 47 2 47 2 47 2 50 2 52
22 1 41 2 44 1 45 2 46 2 46 2 49 2 51
23 1 40 1 43 2 45 2 46 2 46 2 49 2 51
24 1 38 2 42 1 43 2 45 2 45 2 48 2 50
25 1 36 1 40 2 42 2 44 2 44 2 47 2 49
26 1 33 2 38 1 39 2 42 2 42 2 45 2 47
27 1 31 1 36 2 38 2 41 2 41 2 44 2 46
28 1 29 2 35 1 36 2 40 2 40 2 43 2 45
29 1 28 1 34 2 36 1 40 2 40 2 43 2 45
30 1 28 2 35 1 36 2 41 2 41 2 44 2 46
31 1 28 1 35 2 37 1 42 2 42 2 45 2 47
32 1 29 2 37 1 38 2 44 2 44 2 47 2 49
33 1 30 1 38 2 40 1 46 2 46 2 49 2 51
34 1 31 2 40 1 41 2 48 2 48 2 51 2 53
35 1 32 1 41 2 43 1 49 2 50 2 53 2 55
36 1 33 2 43 1 44 2 51 2 52 2 55 2 57
37 1 33 1 43 2 45 n/a 51 2 53 2 56 2 58
38 1 33 2 44 1 45 n/a 52 2 54 2 57 2 59
39 1 33 1 44 2 46 n/a 52 2 55 2 58 2 60
40 1 33 2 45 1 46 n/a 53 2 56 2 59 2 61
41 1 33 1 45 2 47 n/a 53 2 57 2 60 2 62
42 1 33 2 46 1 47 n/a 54 2 58 2 61 2 63
43 1 33 1 46 2 48 n/a n/a 2 59 2 62 2 64
44 1 33 2 47 1 48 n/a n/a 2 60 2 63 2 65
45 1 33 1 47 2 49 n/a n/a 2 61 2 64 2 66
46 1 33 2 48 1 49 n/a n/a 2 62 2 65 2 66
47 1 33 1 48 2 50 n/a n/a 2 63 2 66 2 66
48 1 33 2 49 1 49 n/a n/a 2 64 2 66 2 66
49 1 33 1 49 2 50 n/a n/a 2 65 2 66 2 66
50 1 33 2 50 1 49 n/a n/a 2 66 2 66 2 66
Source: Prepared by CRS using Navy data.   n/a = data not available
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Table 6. Notional Procurement Profiles for Various Force Sizes
(Years with 3 or 4 boats shown in bold)
FY
Target size of force to be supported — total number of boats in force
30 40
48













07 1 56 1 56 1 56 1 56 2 56 2 56 2 56 2 56 2 56
08 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 57 2 57 2 57 2 57 3 57 3 57
09 1 57 1 57 1 57 2 57 2 57 2 57 2 57 3 57 4 57
10 1 56 1 56 1 56 2 56 2 56 2 56 2 56 4 56 4 56
11 1 57 1 57 1 57 2 57 2 57 2 57 3 57 4 57 4 57
12 1 58 2 58 2 58 2 58 2 58 2 58 3 58 3 58 4 58
13 1 59 2 59 2 59 2 59 2 59 2 59 3 59 3 59 4 59
14 1 55 2 55 3 55 2 55 2 55 2 55 2 55 2 55 4 55
15 1 55 2 55 2 55 2 56 2 58 2 58 2 58 2 60 4 61
16 1 51 2 51 3 51 2 53 2 55 2 55 3 55 3 59 4 60
17 1 49 2 49 3 49 2 52 2 54 2 54 3 55 3 60 4 61
18 1 46 2 47 3 47 3 50 2 52 3 52 3 54 3 59 3 61
19 1 45 2 47 3 47 3 50 2 52 3 52 3 55 3 60 3 63
20 1 44 2 47 3 48 3 50 3 52 3 52 3 55 3 60 4 65
21 1 43 2 47 3 48 3 50 3 52 3 52 3 55 3 60 3 67
22 2 41 2 46 3 48 3 49 3 51 3 51 3 55 3 60 3 68
23 2 40 2 46 2 49 2 49 2 51 2 51 2 56 2 61 2 70
24 1 38 1 45 1 49 1 49 1 50 1 51 1 56 1 61 1 70
25 1 36 1 44 1 49 1 49 1 49 1 51 1 56 1 61 1 70
26 0 33 0 42 0 48 0 48 0 48 0 50 0 55 0 60 0 70
27 0 31 0 41 0 48 0 48 0 48 0 50 0 55 0 60 0 70
28 0 30 0 40 0 48 0 48 0 48 0 50 0 55 0 60 0 70
29 0 30 0 40 0 48 0 48 0 48 0 50 0 55 0 60 0 70
30 0 30 0 40 0 48 0 48 0 48 0 50 0 55 0 60 0 70
31 1 30 1 40 1 48 1 48 1 48 1 50 1 55 1 60 1 70
Source: Prepared by CRS using U.S. Navy data.
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
General.  In addition to GD/EB and NGNN, the submarine construction
industrial base includes scores of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research
facilities, in numerous states.  By dollar value of what they provide, more than 80%
of the supplier firms are the sole sources of what they make for the U.S. submarine
program.  Observers in recent years have expressed concern for the continued
survival of many of these firms.
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Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
29 See, for example, Andrew Chuter, “U.K. Spending Mounts for U.S. Help on Sub,”
Defense News, September 13, 2005: 4; Richard Scott, “Electric Boat Provides Project
Director for Astute Class,” Jane’s Navy International, May 2004: 33; Richard Scott, “Astute
Sets Out on the Long Road to Recovery,” Jane’s Navy International, Dec. 2003, pp. 28-30;
Richard Scott, “Recovery Plan Shapes Up for Astute Submarines,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
Nov. 19, 2003, p. 26.
30 Christopher P. Cavas, “Electric Boat To Lay Off Up To 2,400 Workers,” NavyTimes.com,
December 6, 2005; Geoff Fein, “Lack Of Sub Work Leads To Layoffs At Electric Boat,”
Defense Daily, December 7, 2005; Renae Merle, “General Dynamics May Lay Off 2,400,”
Washington Post, December 7, 2005: D2.
The submarine construction industrial base went through a period of significant
stress due to very low levels of work in the 1990s, after procurement of Seawolf
submarines was terminated and before procurement of Virginia-class submarines
began.  The situation appears to have stabilized in recent years under one-per-year
procurement of Virginia-class boats.  For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers,
an additional source of stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
construction program.28  In terms of work provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear
propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
Design and Engineering Portion.  The part of the submarine industrial
base that some observers are currently most concerned about is not the construction
portion, but the design and engineering portion, much of which is resident at GD/EB
and NGNN.  With Virginia-class design work now winding down and no other
submarine-design projects underway, the submarine design and engineering base is
facing the near-term prospect, for the first time in about 50 years, of having no major
submarine-design project on which to work.
Some Navy and industry officials are concerned that unless a major submarine-
design project is begun soon, the submarine design and engineering base will begin
to atrophy through the departure of experienced personnel.  Rebuilding an atrophied
submarine design and engineering base, these Navy and industry officials believe,
could be time-consuming, adding time and cost to the task of the next submarine-
design effort, whenever it might begin.  Concern about this possibility among some
Navy and industry officials has been strengthened by the UK’s recent difficulties in
designing its new Astute-class SSN.  The UK submarine design and engineering base
atrophied for lack of work, and the subsequent Astute-class design effort experienced
considerable delays and cost overruns.  Submarine designers and engineers from
GD/EB were assigned to the Astute-class project to help the UK overcome these
problems.29
On December 6, 2005, GD/EB announced that it would reduce its workforce by
1,900 to 2,400 people by the end of 2006.30  Included in this planned reduction are
300 to 400 employees who belong to the Marine Draftsmen Association (MDA), the
union that represents submarine designers at GD/EB.
CRS-16
31 This section is based on Navy testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006, and to the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, and April 6, 2006.
Issues for Congress
The current situation regarding attack submarines poses at least three potential
issues for Congress:
! Is 48 the correct number of SSNs to meet future needs?
! Should the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement be
accelerated from FY2012 to an earlier year, such as FY2009, so as
to come closer to maintaining a force of 48 SSNs in the 2020s-
2030s?
! How should the submarine design and engineering base be
maintained in coming years?
Each of these issues is addressed below.
48-Boat Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
Is 48 the correct number of SSNs to meet future needs?
Navy View.31  In support of its position that 48 is the correct number of SSNs
to meet future needs, the Navy argues the following:
! The figure of 48 SSNs was derived from a number of force-level
studies that converged on a figure of about 48 boats, making this
figure an analytical “sweet spot.”
! A force of 48 boats is a moderate-risk (i.e., acceptable-risk) force, as
opposed to the low-risk force called for in the 1999 JCS study.
! A force of 48 boats will be sufficient in coming years to maintain
about 10 forward-deployed SSNs on a day-to-day basis — the same
number of forward-deployed boats that the Navy has previously
maintained with a force of more than 50 SSNs.  The Navy will be
able to maintain 10 forward-deployed SSNs in coming years with
only 48 boats because the force in coming years will include an
increased number of newer SSNs that require less maintenance over
their lives and consequently are available for operation a greater
percentage of the time.
! U.S. regional military commanders would prefer a day-to-day
forward-deployed total of about 18 SSNs, but total of 10 will be
sufficient to meet their most-critical needs.
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32 These points are based on Konetzni’s testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006.
33 For more on China’s submarine force, and China’s naval modernization effort in general,
see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
! All 10 of the forward-deployed SSNs are needed for day-to-day
missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, while
about 7.5 of these submarines are also needed to ensure that an
adequate number of SSNs are in position for the opening phases of
potential conflicts in various locations.
Alternative View.  Some observers believe that more than 48 SSNs will be
needed to meet future needs.  One such observer — retired Vice Admiral Albert
Konetzni, Jr., a former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet submarine force —
argues the following:32
! The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses called for a force of 48 to 60
SSNs.  In this context, a force of 48 SSNs looks more like a sour
spot than a sweet spot.
! The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses reflect “reverse engineering,”
in which an SSN force-level number is selected at the outset for
affordability reasons, and assumptions used in the force-level study
are then adjusted to produce that figure.
! The 1999 JCS study on SSN requirements remains valid today.
! All of the U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for day-
to-day forward-deployed SSNs, and not just the 60% or so of those
requirements that are being met, are critical.
! In light of the potential size of China’s submarine force in 2020, a
force of 48 SSNs in that year will be insufficient.33
Accelerated Virginia-Class Procurement
Should the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement be accelerated
from FY2012 to an earlier year, such as FY2009, so as to come closer to maintaining
a force of 48 SSNs in the 2020s-2030s?
Navy View.  In support of its position that two-per-year Virginia-class
procurement should not start until FY2012, the Navy argues the following:
! Given constraints on Navy funding, the Navy cannot afford to
accelerate the start of two-per-year procurement to a year earlier than
FY2012 without reducing funding for one or more other Navy
programs budgeted that year.  Accommodating the $7.4 billion in
additional funding that would be needed between FY2007 and
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FY2011 to accelerate the start of two-per-year procurement to
FY2009 would require substantial reductions to other Navy
programs.  The operational risk that would be created by reducing
funding for these other programs is greater than the operational risk
that would result from waiting until FY2012 to start two-per-year
procurement of Virginia-class boats.
! The Navy can manage the operational risk of having fewer than 48
SSNs in the 2020s-2030s by taking steps at that time (such as
deferring maintenance) to maximize the operational availability of
SSNs, and by shifting SSNs from lower-risk areas of operation to
higher-risk areas.  Although the force will be below 48 boats for 14
years, for some of these years, the shortfall will be only one or two
or three boats.
! The Navy can mitigate or eliminate the projected SSN shortfall
without accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class
procurement by adding up to eight additional SSNs to the
procurement plan in the period 11-year FY2012-FY2022.
! If two Virginia-class boats were procured per year before FY2012,
those boats would not meet the Navy’s unit procurement cost target
of $2.0 billion each in FY2005 dollars, because certain cost-reducing
technologies needed to meet the $2.0-billion target will not be ready
until FY2012.
Alternative View.  Supporters of accelerating Virginia-class procurement to
a year earlier than FY2012 could argue one or more of the following:
! The operational risks of allowing the SSN force to drop below 48 are
unacceptable.  The Navy has described the 48-boat goal as a
moderate-risk force, so dropping substantially below 48 boats would
imply a high-risk force.  If the force drops to 40 boats, as currently
projected, the Navy would be without one of every six SSNs it is
supposed to have.  Although the deepest part of the projected SSN
shortfall lasts only a certain number of years, potential adversaries
can know in advance when this will occur and make plans to take
advantage of it.
! If the Navy attempts to manage the shortfall period by deferring
maintenance on SSNs, this will likely create an SSN maintenance
backlog that will reduce SSN operational availability in the years
after the shortfall, creating a virtual SSN shortfall in those years. If
the Navy attempts to manage the SSN shortfall by shifting SSNs
from some operational areas to others, it could increased operational
risks in the vacated areas.
! Accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement to
FY2009 would mitigate the projected SSN shortfall to a meaningful
degree by creating a force that would bottom out at 43 boats rather
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than 40, and by reducing the projected shortfall period from 14 years
to about 8 years.  (See Table 5, column entitled “2/year starting
FY09.”)
! The Navy may find it very difficult to fund three Virginia-class boats
per year in future years without forcing undue reductions in other
Navy programs.  Accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-
class procurement to a year earlier than FY2012 would reduce the
number of years in FY2012 and beyond where three SSNs per year
would need to be procured to further mitigate, or fully eliminate, the
SSN shortfall.  (See Table 6, column entitled “48 B — 2/year starts
FY09.”)
! Accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement to
a year earlier than FY2012 would mitigate a potential roller-coaster
effect on shipyard and supplier-firm workloads and employment
levels that would result if SSNs were procured for several years at
one per year, then increased at some future point to three per year,
then fell back to 1.5 or two per year.
! Accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement to
a year earlier than FY2012 would permit the Navy to begin reaping
sooner the cost-reducing effects of procuring two SSNs per year.
The boats might cost more than the Navy’s target of $2.0 billion
each in FY2005 dollars, but this is an internal Navy goal that need
not control congressional action.
Maintaining The Design and Engineering Base
How should the submarine design and engineering base be maintained in
coming years?
Navy and industry officials appear to agree that preserving the submarine design
and engineering base over the next several years will require funding submarine
design and engineering work that is in addition to the amount of such work currently
planned.  In assessing options for additional submarine design and engineering work,
issues of interest include the total volume of work that the options would provide,
and the number of submarine design and engineering skills they would engage and
thereby help preserve.  The Navy believes that roughly two dozen design and
engineering skills areas need to be preserved for the United States to retain an ability
to design nuclear-powered submarines.  Options for additional work for the
submarine design and engineering base over the next few years include the following:
! Expanded Virginia-class modification effort.  The Navy is
currently funding certain work to modify the Virginia-class design,
in part to reach the Navy’s Virginia-class cost-reduction target.  The
scope of this effort could be expanded to include a greater number
and variety of modifications.  An expanded modification effort
would add to the amount of submarine design and engineering work
currently programmed, but by itself might not be sufficient in terms
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of volume of work or number of skills areas engaged to fully
preserve the submarine design and engineering base.
! New Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS).  The ASDS is a
mini-submarine that is attached to the back of an SSGN or SSN to
support operations by Navy special operations forces (SOF), who are
called SEALs, an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land.  DOD
has decided, after building one copy of the current ASDS design, not
to put that design into serial production.  Some observers have
proposed developing a new ASDS design with the intention of
putting this new design into serial production.  This option, like the
previous one, would add to the amount of submarine design and
engineering work currently programmed, but by itself might not be
sufficient in terms of volume of work or number of skills areas
engaged to fully preserve the submarine design and engineering
base.
! Diesel-electric submarine for Taiwan.  In April 2001, the Bush
Administration announced a proposed arms-sales package for
Taiwan that included, among other things, eight diesel-electric
submarines.34  Since foreign countries that build diesel-electric
submarines appear reluctant to make their designs available for a
program to build such boats for Taiwan, some observers have
proposed that the United States develop its own design for this
purpose.  This option would generate a substantial volume of work
and engage many skill areas.  Uncertainty over whether and when
this project might occur could make it difficult to confidently
incorporate it into an integrated schedule of work for preserving the
U.S. design and engineering base.  Although the project would
engage many skill areas, it might not engage all of them.  Skills
related to the design of nuclear propulsion plants, for example, might
not be engaged.  This project might raise concerns regarding the
potential for unintended transfer of sensitive U.S. submarine
technology — an issue that has been cited by the Navy in the past for
not supporting the idea of designing and building diesel-electric
submarines in the United States for sale to foreign buyers.35
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! New SSN design.  Developing a completely new SSN design as the
successor to the Virginia-class design would fully support the design
and engineering base for several years.  The Navy estimates that the
cost of this option would be roughly equivalent to the procurement
cost of three SSNs.   The House version of the FY2006 defense
authorization bill (H.R. 1815) proposed this idea, but the idea was
not supported by the Navy, in large part because of its cost, and the
conference version of the bill did not mandate it.
! Accelerated start of next SSBN design.  Given the ages of the
Navy’s 14 current SSBNs, work on a replacement SSBN design
would normally not need to start until FY2012-FY2014.  The start
of this project, however, could be accelerated to FY2007.  The
project would then be carried out as a steady-state effort over several
years, rather than as a more-concentrated effort starting in FY2012-
FY2014.  This option could provide a significant amount of
submarine design and engineering work for several years, and could
engage all submarine design and engineering skills.  The total cost
of this effort would be comparable to that of the previous option of
designing a new SSN, but this option would accelerate a cost that the
Navy already plans to incur, whereas the option for designing a new
SSN would be an additional cost.
The Navy has stated that it is aware of the need to devise a strategy to preserve
the submarine design and engineering base, and that it has asked the RAND
Corporation to study the issue and report back to the Navy later this year.  Some
supporters of the submarine design and engineering base are concerned that elements
of the design and engineering base might atrophy below critical minimum levels
during the time that the Navy is waiting to learn the results of the RAND study.
Legislative Activity for FY2007
FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5122/S. 2766)
House. Section 121 of H.R. 5122 would amend 10 USC 5062 to state that
“The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 48 operational
attack submarines.  For purposes of this subsection, an operational attack submarine
includes an attack submarine that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide
deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.”
Section 331 of the bill would require the Navy to submit a report on submarine
depot maintenance “describing the criteria used when a nuclear attack submarine is
sent to a facility other than a facility located within 200 miles of the homeport of the
submarine for maintenance....”
Section 1221 of the bill makes findings supporting the proposed sale of eight
diesel-electric submarines to Taiwan, and states: “It shall be the policy of the United
States to make available to Taiwan plans and options for design work and
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construction work on future diesel electric submarines under the United States
foreign military sales process.  The availability of such design work and construction
work shall be made in a manner consistent with United States national disclosure
policy and is subject to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2751 et seq.) and any other export control law of the United States.”  The section also
requires DOD to submit a report “on the present and future efforts of the Department
of the Navy to execute the policy of the President to sell diesel electric submarines
to the Republic of China on Taiwan.”
The House Armed Services Committee’s report on the bill (H.Rept. 109-452 of
May 5, 2006) recommends $400 million in additional FY2007 advance procurement
funding to support the acceleration of two-per year Virginia-class procurement
to FY2009.  The report states:
The Navy recently published a long-term shipbuilding plan that supports the goal
of building and maintaining a 313 ship Navy by 2020.  Although this plan
provides the needed “stability” that the U.S. shipbuilding industry has been
looking for, it does not appear to generate enough work to keep the major U.S.
shipbuilders operating at their current capacity.  Evidence of this is most obvious
at General Dynamics Electric Boat Division where the contractor is planning to
lay off hundreds of designers and engineers and thousands of production workers
in the next several years.  The plan to increase the procurement of Virginia class
submarines from 1 to 2 per year has been delayed for over 10 years and the latest
plan has the increase happening in fiscal year 2012.  (Page 70)
The report also states:
The committee believes that the Navy’s attack submarine force structure
must be maintained at no less than 48 submarines in order to meet potential
global commitments. The Navy’s Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of
Naval Vessels for fiscal year 2007 shows that the force will decrease below 48
attack submarines between 2020 and 2033, reaching a low of 40 attack
submarines in 2028 and 2029. The committee believes that a reduction below 48
attack submarines puts the country in a position of unacceptable risk.  (Page 71)
The report recommends an additional $25 million in research and development
funding for design work on a flexible payload module and payload interface
module for Virginia-class SSNs.  The report states:
The budget request contained $169.6 million in PE 64558N for the
[Virginia-class design], but included no funds for flexible payload module and
payload interface module development.
The committee understands the flexible payload module will allow
payloads, such as Tomahawk missiles, to be located outside of the submarine’s
pressure hull, resulting in significant cost savings.  The flexible payload module
will house the new or existing payloads in a pressure proof or free-flooded
environment.  The payload interface module is the shipboard structure and
standardized interface linking the submarine’s combat system with the payload.
(Page 189)
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The report recommends an additional $20 million in research and development
funding for development of a large-aperture bow (LAB) sonar array for Virginia-
class SSNs.  The report states:
The budget request contained $169.6 million in PE 64558N for the new
design SSN, but included no funds for the development of the large aperture bow
(LAB) array sonar for the Virginia class attack submarine.
The committee is aware that the LAB array is a water-backed replacement
for the air-backed spherical array in the bow of Virginia class submarines. The
LAB uses longer-lived, lower cost sensors and commercial-off-the-shelf
electronics, yielding a cost savings of about $15.0 million per ship and additional
lifecycle cost savings. The committee is also aware that with a larger aperture
and expanded frequency coverage, there will be a significant improvement to the
anti-submarine warfare capabilities of the Virginia class submarine. Importantly,
the LAB also allows additional payload by providing bow dome arrangement
flexibility and allows for rapid insertion of future sensor technologies, and is a
transformational approach to outboard sonar array design. The committee
understands the preliminary design will be completed in 2006 and if inserted in
the 2009 Virginia class hull, would provide $300.0 million in savings for the
remainder of the Virginia class submarine construction program.  (Page 190)
The report recommends $10 million in research and development funding for
a competition to design a new Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) mini-
submarine.  The report states:
The budget request contained $32.5 million in PE 1160426BB for advanced
SEAL delivery systems development, but included no funds for a new design
competition.
The committee understands that the Department of Defense recently
cancelled the advanced SEAL delivery system (ASDS) due to its performance
and reliability to date.  The committee believes a new design competition will
ensure that the most current technologies are incorporated into future ASDS
designs and will provide valuable information for future decisions regarding the
ASDS program.
The committee recommends $42.5 million in PE 1160426BB for advanced
SEAL delivery systems development, an increase of $10.0 million for a new
design competition.  (Page 240)
The report also states:
The committee acknowledges the Department of Defense’s recent decision
to cancel the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) program due to its
performance and reliability to date.  The committee has expressed its continued
concern regarding technical issues, contractor performance, and cost growths
throughout the life of the program and will continue to closely monitor the
development and fielding of this capability.  Additionally, due to the troubled
history surrounding the development of ASDS, the committee wants to ensure
that the ASDS improvement program (AIP) and accompanying ASDS concept
study consider the most current technologies for incorporation into future ASDS
capabilities and designs.
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Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct an
ASDS design competition during fiscal year 2007 and authorizes an additional
$10.0 million in research and development funding specifically for this
competition.  Design competition in fiscal year 2007 will ensure that ASDS
program decisions made upon completion of the critical systems review portion
of the AIP and of phase three of the ASDS concept study take into account
current technologies and designs available through related industry research and
development as well as the lessons learned from the critical systems review and
ASDS concept study.  Finally, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to
report to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on
Armed Services by June 1, 2007, on the results of the AIP’s critical systems
review and on the status of an overall ASDS program decision.  (Page 131)
Senate.  The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 109-254
of May 9, 2006) on S. 2766, recommended approving the Navy’s requested amount
for FY2007 procurement funding for the Virginia-class program.  The report states:
The Secretary of the Navy submitted a report to Congress on the long-range
plan for construction of naval vessels with the fiscal year 2007 budget request.
This plan reflects the determination by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that
the National Defense Strategy requires a fleet of 313 ships, including 48 attack
submarines, to meet the threat in future years.  In testimony before the
Subcommittee on Seapower of the Committee on Armed Services, the Navy
witnesses described the level of 48 attack submarines as the minimum level
necessary to support both wartime and peacetime requirements.
The Navy also indicated that, with currently planned construction, attack
submarine forces drop below 48 submarines for 15 years.  The future-years
defense program (FYDP) supports building only one attack submarine per year
through fiscal year 2011, with sufficient advance procurement during the FYDP
to support increasing the production rate to two boats per year in fiscal year
2012.  The Navy’s leadership has stated that they need to get the price of
Virginia-class attack submarines to a level of $2.0 billion per boat before
increasing the build rate.  The committee completely agrees with the Navy’s
affordability focus, but simultaneously views the most important step to improve
affordability is to increase the production rate of the Virginia-class to more than
one boat per year.
The committee understands that the Navy is trying to modernize in a
constrained fiscal environment.  However, the committee does not understand the
continuing delays in increasing the construction rate.  By the Navy’s own
assessment: (1) submarines perform a uniquely Navy mission; (2) the minimum
requirement is to have 48 attack submarines; (3) submarine force levels will fall
below 48 during the next decade and remain there for 15 years; (4) the Navy
needs to achieve cost reductions in attack submarine construction in order to
increase production rates without impinging on other priority shipbuilding
programs; and (5) there are potential technology insertion opportunities that
might help reduce costs and permit the Navy to increase the production rate.
Having said that, the Navy’s and industry’s plan for achieving the $2.0 billion
per boat cost goal requires greater definition.  The Navy has referred to efforts
to develop a number of improvements for the Virginia-class that target cost
reductions.  The committee is concerned, however, that without more specific
plans with defined goals and benchmarks, the Navy will get to the end of the
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FYDP  and not necessarily be any closer to achieving real cost reductions in this
program.  Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit
with the fiscal year 2008 budget request a detailed plan for developing cost
reduction measures with defined goals and benchmarks for the Virginia-class
production program.  (Pages 115-116)
The report recommends $65 million in additional research and development
funding for Virginia-class design work, and $10 million in additional research and
development funding to begin design work on the next SSBN.  The report states:
The budget request included $169.6 million in PE 64558N for the
continuing development of the Virginia-class submarine, and $140.4 million in
PE 63561N for advanced submarine systems development.  The design and
development efforts in these programs are to evaluate a broad range of system
and technology alternatives to directly support and enhance the mission
capability of the Virginia-class and future submarine concepts.
The budget request included $20.0 million for affordability design, but
included no funding for concept formulation for the next generation strategic
submarine platform. Similarly, the budget request included no funding to
continue development of a family of systems and capabilities, the focus of which
is to spirally incorporate capabilities needed to enhance undersea superiority of
the Virginia-class.  The committee believes that continued investment in these
capabilities is needed to meet the future threat.  However, the most important
measure to increase operational capability of the Virginia-class is to increase the
program’s building rate as soon as practical.  The committee is concerned that
the Navy’s proposed shipbuilding program is insufficient to meet the submarine
force structure requirements outlined in the Secretary of the Navy’s report on the
long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels.  The committee urges the
Navy to mitigate this shortfall by moving toward a production goal of two
submarines per year beginning in 2010.  The committee is aware that the Chief
of Naval Operations has established an affordability threshhold as a criterion for
increasing the submarine procurement rate, and recognizes that initiatives to add
critical capabilities to the Virginia-class need to be accomplished in a manner
that supports the established affordability  objectives.
The committee recommends an increase of $65.0 million in PE 64558N to
support cost reduction initiatives for the Virginia-class design and construction.
This additional funding is to include the design and development, leading to
affordable integration of the following capabilities into the Virginia-class:
(1) Multi-Mission Module;
(2) Large Aperture Bow Array;
(3) spiral Alpha for the Virginia-class Warfare Management System;
(4) Common Open Architecture Weapon System Components;
(5) Submarine Network-centric Capability Technology Insertion; and
(6) Submarine Command & Control Systems Advanced Technology
Insertion.
The committee is further concerned that, for the first time in more than 50
years, the United States is not actively engaged in the design of a new class of
nuclear submarine.  The current Navy schedule to initiate the next generation
submarine platform design causes a significant gap in the design and engineering
industrial workload such that the industrial base will not likely be able to
preserve the critical skills and capabilities needed for this effort.  Testimony by
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industry and Navy experts before the Subcommittee on Seapower of the
Committee on Armed Services emphasized the criticality of maintaining a viable
submarine design industrial base to avoid the severe delays and cost overruns
experienced by other navies, whose design base atrophied during lengthy periods
between new design efforts.  The committee recommends an increase of $10.0
million in PE 63561N to initiate concept formulation on the next generation
submarine platform, including alternate design approaches, integration of future
weapons systems, and mission capabilities.  (Pages 177-178)
